For most of the twentieth century, U.S. cities -and their high-poverty neighborhoods in particular --were viewed as dangerous, crime-ridden places that middle class, mobile (and typically white) households avoided, fueling suburbanization. While some pundits and policy analysts bemoaned this urban flight, others voiced concern over the potential impact of crime-ridden environments on the urban residents who were left behind. In the past decade or so, the media has instead highlighted the dramatic reductions in crime taking place in many large cities.
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In this paper we explore these crime reductions and their implications for urban environments. We begin by examining the changes in central city crime rates in greater detail, documenting how central cities fared relative to suburban communities and examining which cities and neighborhoods experienced the largest declines. Given these patterns, we then explore two key questions: (1) whether and how these changes altered existing disparities in safety (or exposure to crime) among particular groups, and (2) the extent to which these reductions increased the relative attractiveness of cities and ultimately led to city growth. In exploring these questions, we draw on theory, past literature, as well as empirical evidence.
I.
Changes in City Crime Between 1990 Between -2005 Between 1990 and 2005, crime rates in the United States as a whole fell by a striking 33%, with similar declines occurring for both property and violent crime (FBI Uniform Crime Reports). In this section, we specifically examine the crime reductions that took place in central cities. We describe crime changes for a sample of 278 cities and their surrounding suburbs.
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City Crime Data
We rely on crime data available through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) State of the City website, which provides electronic annual crime rates for over 500 central cities, and more than 6,800 suburban places beginning in 1992. To define the suburbs of any particular central city, we match the city to the metropolitan area in which it was located in 1990 and then define its suburbs as all parts of that metropolitan area that are not in a central city. We then aggregate up crime rates from all non-central city reporting agencies in that metropolitan area, for each year to get the suburban crime rate.
The website reports crime data for 1992 and then annual data from 1997-2005.
However, we are confident that crime rates declined fairly steadily between 1992 and 1997, for in an analysis of a sample of 150 large central cities for which we manually collected annual crime data, we found that crime rates peaked in 1992 and then declined monotonically until 1997 (Ellen and O'Regan 2008) .
Data are missing for particular cities within coverage years as well.
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To minimize our reliance on estimated rates and to build a consistent panel of cities to examine, we only include cities with complete data, or for which we had complete data in all years but one.
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We also only include cities if we have suburban crime data from surrounding 1 In many years, a few states did not report crime data at the city level. In addition, where monthly data is not provided by the local reporting agency, the FBI uses an estimation procedure that relies on those months the agency does report. The HUD/FBI data does identify which annual crime rates are based on incomplete reporting data, and whether the incomplete data are based on 3-11 months of reported data, or fewer than 3 months. 2 We consider data for an agency to be complete in a given year if the annual crime rate is based on at least three months of actual data.
3 reporting agencies which cover at least 80% of the total suburban population.
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In total,
we are able to identify city and suburban crime rates for 278 central cities. Figure 1 shows trends in the average crime rate for our sample of 278 central cities from 1992 through 2005.
Changes in central city crime rates
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(We report total crimes per 100,000 people, and weight the average by city population.) The top line is crime rates for central cities and shows that there was a dramatic decline in total crime rates in these cities beginning in 1992.
From an average of over 9,200 reported crimes per 100,000 in 1992, to just over 5,600 in 4 2005, these cities experienced a 39 percent decline in total crime during this 12-year period. The largest declines occurred in the 1990s, with some additional small declines post 2000. Property and violent crimes declined at similar rates: 38% and 48%, respectively. Overall, average crime rates in cities fell even more sharply than crime in the country as a whole during this period, suggesting that cities became relatively safer compared to the rest of the country.
Crime rates in cities also declined more sharply than crime in their own surrounding suburbs. As shown by the second line on the graph, while the suburbs also experienced a steady reduction in crime, the decline was not quite as dramatic as that taking place in cities. As a result, the difference between city crime rates and suburban crime rates fell from a high of about 4,100 crimes per 100,000 people in cities in 1992 to a low of about 2,100 in 2005. Indeed, 36 percent of the central cities in our sample had crime rates in 2005 that were lower than the average suburban crime rate in 1992; more than a quarter of our cities had 2005 crime rates that were lower than those in their surrounding suburbs in 1992.
While cities clearly became safer, and safer relative to their suburbs on average, we also find meaningful variation. Figure 2 reports the distribution of changes in city crime rates over this time period, documenting the large variation in experience. Indeed, nearly a quarter of our cities experienced declines of 15% or less, and in 10% of our cities, crime rates increased from 1992 to 2005. Liska, Logan and Bellair (1996) look specifically at race and crime in the suburbs.
Although both crime rates and minority population shares are lower in suburbs than in central cities, they again find an association. In suburbs where minority population shares were relatively high in 1990, crime rates tended to be higher. Notably, the association between racial composition and crime was not quite as large as the association between the poverty rate (or the share of single-parent households) and crime.
As for exposure to crime at the neighborhood level, Logan and Stults (1999) use data from the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 1990 Census and find that in 1990, the average black person lived in a neighborhood with a property crime rate two-thirds higher than the average white person. Indeed, they find that in 1990, race was a more powerful predictor of exposure to neighborhood crime than income -affluent blacks lived in neighborhoods with higher crime rates than those lived in by poor whites.
Evidence on changes in City-level exposure to crime
Given the dramatic reductions in crime that took place during the 1990s, it seems likely that the relationships reported above have changed. Indeed, given that crime reductions were largest in large central cities with large poor and minority populations, it seems likely that poor and minority populations may have differentially benefited from the fall in crime.
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To test this possibility, we calculate exposure-rates for relevant populations in both 1992 and 2000. In essence, these exposure rates describe the 7 'average' or typical city crime rate experienced by a member of a given population group in 1992 and 2000.
8 Table 2 presents our summary results. The first column shows the average or typical city-level crime exposure rates by demographic group for 1992, 9 while the second column shows crime rates for 2000. As shown, exposure to crime declined significantly for all groups during this period. By 2000, the average member of every group lived in a city with a crime rate of less than 7,000 crimes per 100,000 people, which was far below the average crime rate experienced by whites in 1992 (8,900).
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The table also shows some convergence among groups. Between 1992 and 2000, average city crime rates fell far more sharply for minorities than they did for whites, thus narrowing the gap in crime rates between whites and non-whites. Indeed, by 2000, Hispanics actually lived in safer cities on average than whites. Part of this may have been due to the relatively large decrease in crime that occurred in heavily immigrant cities.
Indeed, while there was virtually no difference between city crimes rates for the average foreign-born city resident and the average native-born city resident in 1990, by 2000, exposure to crime was noticeably lower for the foreign born. The table also shows a modest reduction in the gap in crime rates between the poor and non-poor.
To focus more clearly on relative differences, Table 3 reports these crime exposure rates as differences from the average exposure rate. The first column shows the number of additional crimes per 100,000 people that a member of the group experiences 8 on average in his/her city in 1992 compared to the average person living in one of our sample cities. For example, the average white person in our sample was exposed to 364 fewer crimes per 100,000 people in her city on average in 1992 than the average city resident in our sample, while the average black person was exposed to 1,046 more. In 2000, the 'white advantage' had decreased to 15 crimes per 100,000 residents, and the black disadvantage had fallen to 775 crimes. In other words, in addition to the average decline in exposure to crime experienced by all, black residents of cities enjoyed an additional decline of 271 crimes per 100,000 people.
For foreign-born and native born, the initially small advantage of the foreign born grew to be as large an advantage as the black disadvantage in 2000. For the poor, the disparity in exposure rates declined from 407 (compared to the average) to 133.
Across the board, in other words, we see a convergence in safety levels (with the exception of the increase in the foreign-born advantage). Of course, these changes only describe shifts in safety at the city level. Given the variation in crime rates within a city, as well as the typical link between disadvantaged populations and crime at the neighborhood level, these same patterns may not hold at the level of the neighborhood.
Evidence on changes in exposure to crime within Cities
Anecdotal reports have recently suggested that as crime fell during the past decade or so, it may have also deconcentrated. Where previously crime was concentrated in a few poor neighborhoods, that is, it may now be more evenly spread across communities. Such a deconcentration would likely have important implications for exposure to crime for particular demographic groups.
As noted above, there is very little research on this question (and virtually no recent research), largely due to the difficulty of gathering crime data at the neighborhood level. We focus on two cities for which we were able to obtain neighborhood crime data:
Cleveland and Denver.
We begin by examining where, within cities, crime declined the most. Table 4 describes the characteristics of Cleveland and Denver neighborhoods overall, and then of the top and bottom quintiles of neighborhoods, ranked by the magnitude of declines in crime (the largest and smallest declines in crime rates). We see patterns similar to those at the city-level, though even more dramatic. Unlike the city level analysis, which revealed only small differences in poverty rates, we find that within these two cities, poverty rates were initially much higher in neighborhoods that experienced the largest declines in crime. These neighborhoods also had a much larger share of households who were renters. In addition, in both cities, neighborhoods experiencing the largest declines in crime rates were less white. In Cleveland, where the minority population is largely black, neighborhoods with the greatest reductions in crime were disproportionately black.
In Denver, where the minority population is more Hispanic, the 'large crime decline' neighborhoods were disproportionately Hispanic and black.
These numbers suggest that even more than at the city level, the distribution of reductions in crime rates may have disproportionately benefited traditionally disadvantaged groups. But again, this analysis is based on where these groups lived in 1990 and doesn't take into account shifts in residential patterns between 1990 and 2000.
To assess the actual change in environments after households adjust locations, Table 5 presents the average exposure to crime for each of these groups, in 1990 and 2000. The first panel provides average rates in Cleveland, and the second panel for Denver.
In Cleveland, we see a large drop in exposure to neighborhood crime across the board, but again the drop was larger for blacks and Hispanics than it was for whites.
Over the course of the decade, black exposure to crime fell to just about the level of white exposure to crime in the early 1990s. We also see a relatively large decline in exposure to crime for the poor; indeed of all these groups, the poor enjoyed the largest absolute decline in exposure to crime.
In Denver, a very different city demographically, we see fairly similar patterns.
Overall reductions in crime are larger, but minority exposure to crime again declined much more than white exposure. Here, Hispanics experienced the most dramatic shift.
Poor households also experienced extremely sharp reductions in exposure to crime, with the difference in average neighborhood crime rates for the poor and non-poor falling from nearly 2,200 crimes per 100,000 people year to just over 900.
In sum, much as at the city level, we saw considerable convergence in exposure to neighborhood crime across groups by the end of the decade. By 2000, at least in Cleveland and Denver, the poor and the non-poor, the non-white and the white, and the foreign-born and the native-born were all living in far more similar neighborhood environments in terms of safety or exposure to crime. In this sense, the reductions in crime were highly progressive.
III. Does Crime reduction drive city growth?
During the 1990s, a number of large cities experienced a notable resurgence. In New York City, for instance, population increased by a remarkable 15 percent, after having fallen by 5 percent during the 1970s. In Chicago, population rose by 4 percent during the 1990s, after having declined by 11 percent during the 1970s. In this second part of the paper, we explore whether reductions in city crime during the 1990s may have contributed to this apparent urban resurgence.
Background on City growth and Crime
Cities grow for two reasons. First, a city may become more attractive relative to its surrounding area, drawing population who would otherwise live in the suburbs.
Second, and perhaps more critically, a city may grow due to the economic growth (population and employment) of the larger region or metropolitan area. Given this, city crime rates may not play a central role in shaping overall city growth rates.
Indeed, economists studying urban growth have not traditionally included crime or urban amenities in their explanatory models. In explaining the variation in growth across cities in the 1990s, for instance, Glaeser and Shapiro (2001) conclude that the factors associated with high growth are: being located in the West, having large service sector industries, high foreign-born populations, high levels of education, and being autodependent. These are really characteristics of metropolitan areas and not cities per se.
Some recent researchers have emphasized the importance of urban amenities, and their appeal to workers, however. Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2000) argue that while the urban economics literature has traditionally focused on the ways in which cities can make themselves more attractive and productive places for firms, the future of cities may depend more critically on their ability to attract increasingly wealthy and footloose workers.
Indeed, Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) argue that the growth that occurred during the 1990s in large, dense cities was driven by increases in labor supply. Specifically, they show that as large, dense cities grew during the 1990s, their real wages declined relative to other areas in the United States, and housing prices increased. This suggests that urban growth in recent years has not been driven by increases in firm productivity in cities but rather by an increase in their ability to attract workers. It is plausible that one key amenity change for cities has been the decline in crime rates.
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There is a fair amount of research exploring the extent to which increases in crime and other perceived sources of urban blight push households out to the suburbs (for overviews, see Bradford and Kelejian, 1973; Mieszkowki and Mills, 1993) . While this theory has intuitive appeal, the empirical support for the importance of crime rates in shaping residential location decisions is decidedly mixed. One reason for the mixed evidence is that in addition to crime affecting residential decisions, residential decisions --and suburbanization in particular -may actually affect crime rates. If models fail to correct for this reverse causality, the resulting estimates are likely to be biased. Farley (1987) and more recently, Jargowsky and Park (2006) suggest several avenues through which suburbanization may well lead to higher crime rates in the central city, including changes in the composition of households in the city and suburb, as well as increased social stratification. Cullen and Levitt (1999) offer some of the most recent (and most widely cited)
work in this area. Unlike the vast majority of previous work, they focus on changes in crime rates, rather than levels. Using a series of data sources and models, they find that 14 increases in crime rates during the 1970s and 1980s led to population losses, and that white households, families and those with greater education are more sensitive to changes in crime. In addition, the authors find that changes in crime rates had their greatest influence on relocation decisions within the metropolitan area. Their work also employs an instrumental variables strategy to better identify a causal relationship, and still finds that increases in crime contributed to lower growth and greater migration to the suburbs.
Of course, even if the prior evidence on the role of increasing or high levels of crime in the depopulation of cities were more consistent, it is not obvious a priori that the relationship between crime and residential decisions would be symmetric -while increases in city crime may push residents away from cities, similarly-sized reductions may not attract them. Thus, the remainder of the paper offers some new empirical evidence to test whether the decline in city crime rates shaped residential decisions and ultimately contributed to city population growth in the 1990s.
Evidence on the effect of reductions in city crime on changes in city population
Building on the work of Cullen and Levitt (1999) and drawing on our recent paper (Ellen and O'Regan, 2009) , we examine whether reductions in central city crimes rates led to overall population gains for cities. We study this more recent time period using census data and Uniform Crime Report data for 1990 through 2005.
Our basic regression models are as follows. include changes in city crime rates over an earlier time period and city crime rates at the start of the time period. Χ is a vector of characteristics of the city at the start of the period, which includes: the initial population, unemployment rate, median family income, the percentage of the city's population that is black, the percentage that is foreign born, the percentage with college degrees, and the percentage that own their homes. We also include measures of the age distribution of the population, the average temperatures in January and July, 1994 total precipitation, and regional dummy variables to capture variation across the nine census regions. All baseline variables are measured at the start of the time period, to minimize endogeneity.
We use decennial census data for city characteristics in 1990 and 2000 and ACS data for 2005 population. Data on city crime rates are taken from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). We estimate our regressions on a sample of 145 large central cities. These are all the central cities that had populations in 1980 of at least 100,000.
A few notes on the specification. While most of the empirical literature on crime and flight examines crime levels, Cullen and Levitt (1999) argue that it is changes in crime rates that should matter for flight since the level of crime has already been factored into decisions of residents to live in a city.
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While this argument makes sense, we think crime levels may still be important too. In particular, once a household makes a decision to move (decisions that are typically prompted by changes in a household's housing needs, such as family formation, child bearing, aging), the choice of which jurisdiction to settle in (including whether to remain in the city or choose a jurisdiction outside) may well depend on the current assessment of relative attractiveness of different location alternatives, which may be based on crime levels or recent changes in crime. Thus, it is unclear a priori whether reductions in crime, or simply low levels of crime, should be more likely to induce households to move to or choose to stay in central cities. For these reasons, we test for effects of both levels and changes.
In terms of the temporal relationship between changes in crime and changes in population, there are important arguments for lagging changes in crime. If these changes are presumed to be causal, they should precede any residential movements they affect.
Lagging crime rates also helps to address endogeneity. However, for our decade models, to focus on changes in crime that precedes 1990 prohibits capturing any of the decline in crime in the early 1990s and moreover would suggest a very long lag between the change in crime and any impact on moves over the second half of the decade. As a compromise, the period of time in which we measure change in crime overlaps with the start of the decade, specifically changes in crime from 1989 to 1994. 14 And even for the 1990s, when we change the time period used to capture crime changes, the coefficients on crime change is not always statistically significant. Finally, it's important to note that our results do not prove causality. Still, we find weak evidence here that changes in crime were at least associated with city population growth, at least for the time period during which crime dropped dramatically. There is little evidence that initial crime levels matter to growth.
It is perhaps not surprising that overall city population is not dramatically affected by crime. Changes in overall city population are driven by a multiplicity of forces, many of which are unlikely to be related to crime: births, deaths, and migration from abroad.
Moreover, this aggregate measure combines the two key residential decisions that we think are likely related to crime -retention and attraction -into a single net effect. In other work, we have examined these distinct channels separately and found that while lower crime rates do not enable cities to attract new residents, they do help them to retain a larger share of those residents who originally live in the central city and who remained 14 Results for 2000-2005 growth regression available from authors upon request.
in the metropolitan area. While not supporting an actual reversal of flight, this latter finding is completely consistent with abating flight. It also suggests that the reductions in crime in cities may have contributed to a shift in the distribution of the population within metropolitan areas.
IV. Conclusions
The findings here show that crime rates fell dramatically in cities during the 1990s and the early years of the 21 st century. City crime rates fell even more sharply than they did in the nation as a whole, and the absolute difference in crime rates in central cities and their surrounding suburbs was cut in half during this time period. These relative reductions in crime appear to have contributed to the ability of cities to retain households who otherwise might move to the suburbs, although the measurable direct impact on overall city growth is modest at best. Beyond impacts on residential decision making, the reductions in crime did clearly change the geography of crime and dramatically reshape differential exposure to crime. Both at the city and neighborhood level, we consistently find that the distribution of crime reductions was highly 'progressive,' with reductions disproportionately benefiting historically disadvantaged groups. 
